The New Natural State: Embracing the Reality of Low Fertility Rates

Introduction: A New Trajectory in Fertility

I’ve been reading up a bit more on physics of late, because I have the time. As I was doing so, a key issue resonated with me. Aristotle first posited that objects move in straight lines unless acted upon; this seemed to clash with the seemingly erratic paths of planets across the night sky. Centuries later, while some of these issues were resolved— that is, the seemingly chaotic movement of the planets around the Earth was down to the fact that they were orbiting the sun rather than our own planet— but even so, an orbit is not a straight line. So what’s going on?

Einstein’s theory of relativity resolved this final paradox: planets follow straight lines in the curved space-time shaped by gravity. What appeared ‘wrong’ was, in fact, natural. 

This idea that we think of something that is wrong, when in fact it is right but it’s our understanding that is wrong, hit me like a brick when it came to birth rates. 

We’re just getting it all wrong and around the wrong way. Global birth and fertility rates have plummeted, from 4.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.3 in 2023, and the position in Scotland and the UK are far worse than this (see any of my blogs on the subject). 

Now many view this decline as a crisis, a deviation from the norm that demands correction. Musk and very recently Badenoch are highlighting this as an issue, that we need to get the fertility and birth rates back to some kind of normal.

But what if, like planetary orbits, these falling rates are the natural trajectory in the curved space-time of our modern world? What if the world around us has changed, creating a new naturally ‘low’ birth rate? 

This might seem pedantic, but it’s not; we’re asking the wrong question. We shouldn’t be asking how we get the birth rate back up to ‘normal’ levels. We should be accepting that this ‘low’ rate is the new normal and planning our economy around it.  

So here I’ll argue that the decline in fertility rates is not a problem to be solved but a feature of a new natural state, shaped by irreversible societal shifts. The high birth rates of the past were not a golden standard but an artifact of an old natural state defined by constraints—high infant mortality, limited horizons, and lack of reproductive choice. 

Today, contraception, expanded horizons through education and technology, economic pressures, and the explosive growth of social media have created a new reality where lower fertility is and will be the norm. In the case of the latter, we’re only just beginning to see the effects on fertility rates, and we can expect further declines to come. 

Attempts to revert to the past are as futile as returning to a world without the internet. Instead, we must adapt our economies and societies to this new normal. 

So through data, historical context, and a fresh perspective inspired by physics, we’ll explore why this new natural state is here to stay and how we must prepare for it.

The Old Natural State: Why Past Birth Rates Were Artificially ‘High’

To grasp why today’s lower fertility rates are the new normal, we must first understand the old natural state that produced higher birth rates. 

In the mid-20th century, the global fertility rate stood at approximately 4.9 children per woman, a figure driven by a world where survival was uncertain and choices were scarce. 

A primary factor was high infant mortality. In 1950, the global infant mortality rate was around 140 per 1,000 live births, meaning many children did not survive to adulthood. We probably all have great uncles and aunties that did not survive to adulthood. Something fewer children will experience today. 

In regions like sub-Saharan Africa, where rates were even higher, fertility rates reached 6.5 or more. Families had more children to ensure some would survive, a necessity rather than a preference. This dynamic inflated birth rates beyond what families might have chosen in a less precarious world.

Beyond survival, the old natural state was characterized by narrower horizons.

By today’s terms, most people lived in insular communities with little exposure to the broader world. Consider a singer in 19th-century Edinburgh, celebrated as a local star because she was the best within her community’s limited frame of reference. She was the big fish in a small pond. There were many ponds around the world, and so many of such big fish. 

Her audience, unaware of global talent, had no reason to expect more. The advent of the gramophone was the start of a process, which has currently developed to Spotify, where these local audiences became global. No longer would Nancy from the local town hall be the benchmark by which good was measured, but good would become a global concept. In other words, these ‘big fish’ found themselves in a global ocean where they found themselves to be rather tiny. 

Similarly, expectations for life partners were confined to the local pool. So finding Mrs. or Mr. Right is just simply easier when your universal pool is local. Hence, men and women married what we would regard as early—often in their late teens or early 20s—choosing from the best available in their village or town.

In the UK in 1950, the average age of first marriage was 23 for women and 25 for men, leading to early childbirth and larger families. This was, I would argue, a natural choice for the time and a reflection of limited options and societal norms that prioritized early family formation.

The absence of effective contraception further entrenched high birth rates. Before the widespread availability of modern methods like the oral contraceptive pill, family planning was unreliable or nonexistent. 

Traditional methods, such as the unreliable withdrawal method, the safe period (which is an accidental result of), or condoms, had high failure rates, and abortion, where available, was often unsafe or heavily stigmatized. 

In this environment, frequent pregnancies were obviously the default. For example, in the United States in 1900, the fertility rate was 3.56, even as urbanization began, because women had little control over reproduction. These factors—high infant mortality, narrow horizons, and lack of contraception—created an old natural state where high birth rates were higher than today, driven by necessity rather than intent. The shift to the new natural state began as these constraints started to dissolve. 

Contraception: A Paradigm Shift in Choice

Before I go on, please note that I don’t regard contraception as the sole driver of the fall of the birth rate. However, it would be naive of me to ignore it, so please read this short section before coming to a conclusion. 

There is no question that the introduction of modern contraception marked a pivotal turning point, permanently shifting the natural state of fertility. The oral contraceptive pill, approved in the 1960s, gave women unprecedented control over family planning, a change that rippled across the globe. 

By 2023, global contraceptive prevalence among women of reproductive age reached 65%, up from less than 10% in 1960. This technological leap correlated with a steep decline in fertility rates, from 4.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.3 in 2023. 

In Kenya, for example, contraceptive use rose from 5% in the 1970s to 51% by the 2010s, while the fertility rate fell from 7.64 to 4.06. This wasn’t merely a technological innovation but a paradigm shift, empowering individuals to make deliberate choices about family size.

This empowerment is a cornerstone of the new natural state. In the old natural state, societal expectations and the lack of an effective choice for many women meant that their role was confined to the role of homemaker, with motherhood as the primary focus. Without reliable contraception, frequent pregnancies were inevitable, inflating birth rates. Hence the ridiculous phrase of old “A woman’s place is in the home”, fortunately that is firmly in the dustbin of history.  

The arrival of contraception shattered this mold, enabling women to pursue education, careers, and personal ambitions—from a ‘place is in the home’ our mantra today is “Sisters Are Doin’ It for Themselves.” 

In Western Europe, where contraceptive access is near-universal, fertility rates now range from 1.5 to 2 children per woman, reflecting intentional family sizes rather than uncontrolled reproduction. 

As I said at the start, contraception is not the only reason for this shift. There are many studies, such as a 2006 analysis, which suggest that contraception alone doesn’t fully explain fertility declines within countries (due to factors like education and economic changes), its role in establishing a new baseline of choice is undeniable. 

By giving women more agency, contraception laid the foundation for the new natural state, where lower fertility reflects deliberate decisions of women and men rather than necessity.

Expanding Horizons: Education and Empowerment

My main argument though is that contraception alone does not explain this new normal. My case is that horizons have shifted and are shifting even further and this is having a profound and irreversible impact on birth rates. 

Over the past half-century, access to education has transformed global societies. In 1970, only 2% of women in low-income countries had secondary education; by 2010, this figure exceeded 30%. In OECD countries, women now outpace men in tertiary education, with 54% enrollment compared to 46% for men in 2020. This educational boom has widened horizons and ambitions, offering women opportunities beyond those offered to their predecessors and reshaping their life priorities.

This shift has naturally delayed marriage and childbirth, contributing to lower fertility rates. 

Globally, the average age of first birth has risen from 24 in 1970 to 28 in 2020. In Japan, the average age of first marriage for women is now 29.4, reflecting an admirable focus on career and personal development. 

Education raises ambitions, much like the gramophone once revealed to 19th-century audiences that their local singer was no match for global talent. 

In the old natural state, limited horizons meant women settled (if settled is the right word, but coerced is too strong) into family roles early; now, exposure to broader possibilities encourages the pursuit of degrees, careers, some of which are undoubtedly harder to pursue simultaneously with marriage and parenthood. 

Let’s be clear: this is massively a positive development, empowering women to define their own paths, increasing the scope of talented people into the workplace, increasing competition in employment and entrepreneurship, all leading to better global economic outcomes, but there is no question that this naturally reduces fertility. 

A key feature of this new reality is that starting families comes later in life, for both men and women. This in itself has a significant impact on the overall fertility rate as it simply shortens the reproductive window for many women (as I’ll consider later). 

Let’s also be clear that this expansion in education and the lifting of horizons is not confined to women only. Rising tertiary education has expanded all horizons and lifted expectations for both sexes. But this expansion in education does come at a price. 

The pursuit of higher education often leads to student debt, which again holds back family formation for both men and women. In the UK, the average student loan debt is £45,000, while in the US, total student debt exceeds $1.7 trillion, affecting 45 million people. 

Many young adults cite debt as a reason to postpone marriage or parenthood, feeling financially unready. There are many arguments which can be put forward for or against this, i.e. are we really saying our parents were better off than us so they had the luxury of having kids early? Or is it that whilst we are better off in absolute terms, our expectations and horizons have expanded so being financially ready for family life is a hurdle that has been raised as our universe has expanded. I’ll return to this shortly. 

This financial burden, tied to the very education that widens horizons, underscores a key dynamic of the new natural state: empowerment and choice come at the cost of delayed life milestones, resulting in fewer children. 

Education has thus reshaped fertility not just through ambition but through the economic realities it entails.

The Search for Mr. or Mrs. Right

I would also argue that expanded horizons have also transformed partner selection, further contributing to the new natural state of lower fertility. 

In the old natural state, narrow horizons meant people chose partners from their local communities, settling for the best available in their village or town. Marriages happened early, driven by proximity and what would now be seen as limited options. 

In the UK in 1950, the average age of first marriage was 23 for women, leading to early childbirth and larger families. Today, technology and travel have inflated the pool of potential partners, raising expectations and delaying commitment. The rise of online dating exemplifies this shift: in 2023, 30% of U.S. adults under 30 reported using dating apps, and Tinder alone boasts 70 million monthly active users globally.

As noted, this search for an ideal partner—Mr. or Mrs. Right—mirrors the local singer analogy. Just as the gramophone exposed audiences to superior talent, global connectivity via apps and travel reveals a world of possibilities, making ‘local’ options seem less appealing. 

This abundance of choice often leads to indecision, as people wait for a better match. In Japan, where fertility fell to 1.26 in 2005, delayed marriage is a key factor, with many citing high standards and career priorities. 

The problem when it comes to the birth rate is that the biological clock doesn’t wait: fertility tends to decline after age 35, with conception chances dropping from 20% per cycle in the early 30s to under 10% in the late 30s. 

By taking longer to search for Mrs. or Mr. Right, we inadvertently reduce our family size, reinforcing the new normal of lower fertility rates. This shift, enabled by expanded horizons, reflects choice but also the constraints of biology in a world of heightened expectations.

Housing

As I noted earlier, economic insecurity—rising housing costs, job volatility, and student debt—can be a driver of falling fertility rates. While these factors play a role, they are often misunderstood as the sole cause, when they are, in my opinion, symptoms of the same horizon expansion driving the new natural state. 

Consider the economic context: in the 1960s, global GDP per capita was just $450 (in constant dollars), compared to $12,000 in 2023. Despite having less disposable income, people in the 1960s had larger families, with global fertility rates near 5 children per woman. If raw economic hardship were the main driver, we’d expect higher fertility then, not lower today.

Therefore, I would argue that the real issue lies in a combination of horizon-driven expectations and a housing shortage. 

Housing costs illustrate this vividly. In the UK, house prices in the 1960s were about 4 times the average annual salary; today, they’re 8-10 times, with an average home costing £290,000 against an average salary of £33,000. In the US, the median home price was 2.3 times median income in 1970 but 5.5 times in 2023.

Unlike the 1960s, when 30% of UK households lived in council housing and renting was common for young families, homeownership is often seen as a prerequisite for starting a family. This cultural shift, tied to inflated horizons, delays parenthood as people save longer or take on larger mortgages.

A factor which is, however, easy to miss is the role of baby boomers, whom we can call “baby blockers.” 

Boomers owning 40% of owner-occupied homes in the UK, often under-occupied, boomers hold much of the housing stock, driving up prices and making it harder for younger generations to buy. 

This, of course, delays family starts, effectively blocking the birth of their own grandchildren! 

These economic barriers are real but not the sole root cause; they reflect higher expectations for stability and lifestyle, shaped by the same horizons that education and technology have expanded. By framing economic insecurity as a symptom of inflated horizons, we see its true role in the new natural state.

Social Media: The Hyper Inflation of Horizons

If education and technology have expanded horizons, social media has propelled them into a phase of cosmic inflation, akin to the rapid expansion of the early universe in physics. 

Platforms like Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok expose users to global lifestyles, careers, and partners, fundamentally reshaping expectations. In 2023, 89% of South Korea’s population used social media, correlating with a fertility rate of just 0.78 children per woman, among the world’s lowest. 

Globally, Tinder’s 70 million monthly users and the 30% of U.S. adults using dating apps highlight how social media amplifies the search for Mrs. or Mr. Right, making ideal partners feel further away.

This inflation of horizons raises the bar for life decisions. Social media showcases idealized lives—luxury homes, exotic travel, perfect relationships—making ordinary options seem inadequate. 

Just as the gramophone and Spotify reveal better singers, social media reveals better possibilities, delaying commitment as people chase unattainable ideals. 

This trend is not static; as social media penetration grows, horizons will continue to inflate, likely pushing fertility rates even lower. In countries like Japan, where social media use is near-universal, the fertility rate has hovered below 1.5 for decades, reflecting a new normal that may become more extreme. Far from a temporary phenomenon, social media’s impact is a structural shift, ensuring that low fertility rates are not just the present but the future.

Conclusion: Accepting and adapting to the New Natural State

Like planets tracing straight lines in the curved space-time of gravity, today’s falling fertility rates are the natural trajectory in the modern world’s curved environment.

The old natural state—marked by high infant mortality, narrow horizons, and lack of contraception—produced artificially high birth rates that no longer apply. 

Contraception, education, technology, economic shifts, and social media have created a new natural state where lower fertility is not a problem but a feature of empowered choice and expanded horizons. 

Yet many misframe this as a crisis, seeking to restore a past that cannot be recovered, like trying to revert to a pre-social media world and telling people to ‘buy a paper’ rather than read their news on their phones. 

The data is clear: global fertility has fallen from 4.9 to 2.3 children per woman since 1950, driven by choice (contraception), ambition (education), higher standards (Mr. or Mrs. Right), economic expectations (housing, debt), and the inflating universe of social media. 

As these horizons continue to expand, fertility rates will probably decline further, particularly in regions with high social media penetration. Rather than lamenting this, or trying to turn back the inevitable tide, we need to adapt.

Economies must prepare better for aging populations, societies must rethink family support, and policies must align with this new reality. The concept that immigration will solve such problems naively believes these changes to be confined to the West. It will take time, but the forces which have created this new natural state in advanced economics are rapidly making their way through less advanced economies. This is a global issue, and immigration is just shuffling the chairs; the key is to turn the bloody boat away from the iceberg and chart a new course. 

The new natural state is not a challenge to overcome but a world to embrace, so let’s stop trying to work out how to ‘fix’ something that isn’t wrong but to adapt to the world we know is coming. 

Sources, key statistics, and supporting web links

1.  Global fertility rate: 4.9 children per woman in 1950 to 2.3 in 2023

• Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2022. The UN provides historical and current fertility data, with the global total fertility rate (TFR) dropping from around 4.9 in the 1950s to 2.3 in recent estimates.

• Link: https://population.un.org/wpp/

• Note: The exact 2023 figure aligns with projections from the UN’s 2022 report, which estimates TFR at 2.3 for 2020-2025.

2.  Global infant mortality rate: 140 per 1,000 live births in 1950, ~28 per 1,000 in 2023

• Source: World Bank and UNICEF data. The World Bank cites a global infant mortality rate of approximately 140 per 1,000 in 1950, while UNICEF’s 2023 data estimates it at 28 per 1,000.

• Link:

• World Bank (historical): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN

• UNICEF (2023): https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-survival/under-five-mortality/

• Note: The 1950 figure is an estimate from historical datasets; 2023 is based on UNICEF’s latest global average.

3.  Sub-Saharan Africa fertility rate: 6.5 or more in 1950

• Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2022. The UN notes high fertility rates in sub-Saharan Africa, averaging above 6.5 in the 1950s.

• Link: https://population.un.org/wpp/

• Note: Regional data is available in UN reports under fertility trends.

4.  UK average age of first marriage: 23 for women, 25 for men in 1950

• Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), UK. Historical marriage data confirms these averages for the UK in 1950.

• Link: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/marriagecohabitationandcivilpartnerships

• Note: ONS provides historical marriage age data in its demographic archives.

5.  US fertility rate: 3.56 in 1900

• Source: U.S. Census Bureau and historical demographic studies. The Census Bureau’s vital statistics data confirms a TFR of around 3.56 in 1900.

•  Link: https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/pre-1980-national.html

•  Note: Exact figures are drawn from historical vital statistics reports.

6.  Global contraceptive prevalence: 65% in 2023, <10% in 1960

•  Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2022). Contraceptive Use by Method report estimates 65% prevalence in recent years, with historical data indicating less than 10% in 1960.

•  Link: https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/contraceptive-use-method-2022

•  Note: The 1960 figure is an estimate based on limited global access pre-pill.

7.  Kenya contraceptive use: 5% in 1970s to 51% in 2010s; fertility rate: 7.64 to 4.06

•  Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program. Kenya DHS reports track contraceptive prevalence and fertility trends.

•  Link: https://dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-fr308-dhs-final-reports.cfm

•  Note: Specific Kenya DHS reports (e.g., 2014) confirm these figures.

8.  Western Europe fertility rates: 1.5 to 2 children per woman

•  Source: Eurostat, Fertility Statistics. Eurostat reports TFRs ranging from 1.5 to 2 across EU countries in recent years.

•  Link: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics

•  Note: Data is updated annually; 2023 figures align with this range.

9.  Women’s tertiary enrollment: 54% vs. 46% for men in OECD countries (2020)

•  Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2020. It reports gender enrollment in tertiary education.

•  Link: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2020_69096873-en

•  Note: Freely accessible summary tables confirm these percentages.

10.  Secondary education for women in low-income countries: 2% in 1970 to 30% in 2010.

•  Source: World Bank, Education Statistics. It tracks female secondary enrollment over time.

•  Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR.FE

•  Note: Data reflects global trends in low-income countries.

11.  Global average age of first birth: 24 in 1970 to 28 in 2020.

•  Source: OECD Family Database. It tracks age at first birth in developed countries, with global estimates from UN data.

•  Link: https://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm

•  Note: Global average is an estimate; OECD data confirms trends in developed nations.

12.  Japan age of first marriage for women: 29.4.

•  Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan, Demographic Survey. It reports marriage age trends.

•  Link: https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-02.html

•  Note: Latest data confirms 29.4 for women in recent years.

13.  UK student debt: £45,000 average; US student debt: $1.7 trillion.

•  Source:

•  UK: Student Loans Company and ONS.

•  US: Federal Reserve and Department of Education.

•  Link:

•  UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/student-loans-in-england-2022-to-2023

•  US: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/

• Note: Figures are widely reported; links provide official data.

14.  US adults under 30 using dating apps: 30%; Tinder: 70 million monthly users

• Source: Pew Research Center (dating apps); Statista (Tinder user base).

• Link:

• Pew: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/06/10-facts-about-americans-and-online-dating/

• Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/826778/tinder-global-monthly-active-users/

• Note: Pew’s 2020 report confirms 30%; Statista provides Tinder’s 2023 estimate.

15.  Fertility drop after age 35: 20% conception chance in early 30s to <10% in late 30s

• Source: American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).

• Link: https://www.acog.org/womens-health/faqs/having-a-baby-after-age-35

• Note: Medical consensus on age-related fertility decline.

16.  Japan fertility rate: 1.26 in 2005

• Source: World Bank, Fertility Rate Data.

• Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=JP

• Note: Historical data confirms Japan’s TFR at 1.26 in 2005.

17.  Global GDP per capita: $450 in 1960 vs. $12,000 in 2023

• Source: World Bank, GDP Per Capita (constant 2015 US$).

• Link: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD

• Note: Adjusted for inflation; 2023 is an estimate from recent data.

18.  UK house prices: 4x salary in 1960 vs. 8-10x now; average home £290,000

• Source: ONS, House Price to Earnings Ratio; Nationwide Building Society.

• Link:

•  ONS: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/housepriceindex/latest

•  Nationwide: https://www.nationwidehousepriceindex.co.uk/

•  Note: ONS confirms 8-10x ratio; £290,000 is the 2023 average.

19.  US median home price: 2.3x income in 1970 vs. 5.5x in 2023

•  Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Federal Reserve.

•  Link: https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/historical_data/

•  Note: Historical housing data confirms the ratio increase.

20.  UK council housing: 30% of households in 1960s vs. 17% now

•  Source: UK Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government.

•  Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-housing-survey-2022-to-2023-headline-report

•  Note: Historical housing tenure data confirms the decline.

21.  Baby boomers own 40% of UK owner-occupied homes

•  Source: Resolution Foundation, Housing and Wealth Report.

•  Link: https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/housing-wealth-and-inequality/

•  Note: Reports confirm over-55s hold ~40% of owner-occupied homes.

22.  South Korea social media penetration: 89%; fertility rate: 0.78 in 2023

•  Source:

•  Social media: Statista, Digital 2023 Report.

•  Fertility: Statistics Korea.

•  Link:

•  Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/242610/number-of-social-network-users-in-south-korea/

•  Statistics Korea: http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/

•  Note: Statista confirms 89% penetration; Korea’s 2023 TFR is reported at 0.78